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Introduction
ince the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force in 2005, atten-
tion has focused on the question of what to do after 2012, 
when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends. 
Should the Kyoto Protocol be extended through the 
adoption of a second commitment period, with a new round of 
emission reduction targets for developed country parties? 
And, if so, should a new agreement be adopted under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),1
which addresses the emissions of countries that either are not par-
ties to the Kyoto Protocol2 (the United States) or do not have Kyoto 
emissions targets (developing countries)? Or should a single new 
agreement be adopted that replaces the Kyoto Protocol and is more 
comprehensive in coverage, addressing both developed and develop-
ing country emissions?
The Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), which met 
from December 7 to 19, 2009, had been intended as the deadline to 
resolve these questions about the post-2012 climate regime – a view 
reflected in the unofficial slogan for the conference, “seal the deal.”3
The decision by more than 100 heads of state or government 
to attend heightened public expectations that the Copenhagen 
Conference would result in a major breakthrough; and more than 
40,000 people registered, making Copenhagen one of the largest 
environmental meetings in history. 
But the lack of progress in the negotiations in the months lead-
ing up to Copenhagen suggested that hopes for a full-fledged legal 
agreement were unrealistic. 
In the end, the Copenhagen Conference resulted only in a politi-
cal agreement, the Copenhagen Accord,4 which was negotiated by 
the leaders of the world’s major economies, but was not formally 
adopted by the conference, leaving its future prospects uncertain. 
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The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen Accord is a political rather than a legal docu-
ment, negotiated by a group of about 25 heads of state, heads of 
government, ministers and other heads of delegations.
Key elements of the accord include the following:
Long-term vision
The Copenhagen Accord recognizes the need to limit global 
temperature increase to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. 
States were unable to agree on other methods of defining the 
regime’s long-term objective, for example, in terms of an upper 
bound on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases such as 
350 or 450 parts per million (ppm), or a long-term goal to reduce 
global emissions by 50 percent by 2050 (the so-called “50 by 50” 
target, which the G-8 has endorsed), or a target date for the peaking 
of global emissions. 
In deference to the small island states, which had pushed for a 
1.5 degree limit on global temperature change, the Copenhagen 
Accord provides that the assessment of the accord by 2015 include 
consideration of this stronger target. 
Developed country mitigation
Over the past year, general consensus has emerged that devel-
oped countries should undertake economy-wide emissions reduc-
tion targets for the post-2012 period, although countries have 
differed about the stringency of these emissions reduction targets, 
the base-year from which reduction targets should be measured and 
whether the targets should be defined using international account-
ing rules (as in Kyoto) or national legislation (as the United States 
has proposed). 
The Copenhagen Accord establishes a bottom-up process that 
allows each developed country party to define its own target level, 
base year and accounting rules, and to submit its target in a defined 
format, for compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Under the 
terms of the accord, Annex I countries “commit to implement” their 
targets, individually or jointly, subject to international monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV).
Developing country mitigation
As with developed country emissions targets, the Copenhagen 
Accord establishes a bottom-up process by which developing coun-
tries will submit their mitigation actions in a defined format for 
compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
It provides that developing countries will submit greenhouse 
gas inventories every two years, that developing country mitigation 
actions will be subject to domestic MRV and that the results of 
this domestic MRV will be reported in biennial national commu-
nications, which will be subject to “international consultations and 
analysis under clearly defined guidelines.” 
The Copenhagen Accord also establishes a registry for listing 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for which inter-
national support is sought and provides that supported NAMAs 
will be subject to international MRV in accordance with COP 
guidelines.
Financial assistance
In Copenhagen, the discussions about financial support revolved 
around the typical issues: how much money, from what sources and 
with what governance arrangements? 
The Copenhagen Accord addresses only the first of these issues, 
leaving the other two for future resolution. 
It creates a “collective commitment” for developed countries to 
provide “new and additional resources . . . approaching $30 billion” 
for the 2010-2012 period, balanced between adaptation and miti-
gation, and sets a longer-term collective “goal” of mobilizing $100 
billion per year by 2020 from all sources, but links this money to 
“meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementa-
tion.”
It also calls for governance of adaptation funding through equal 
representation by developing and developed country parties but 
does not establish the governance arrangement for finance more 
generally. 
Finally, it calls for the establishment of a Copenhagen Green 
Climate Fund as an operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial 
mechanism as well as a high level panel to consider potential sources 
of revenue to meet the $100 billion per year goal.
Forestry
In the run-up to Copenhagen, the potential to reduce emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation (known as 
“REDD-plus”) received considerable attention. The principal 
question has been whether to finance REDD-plus from public 
funds or by providing carbon credits. 
The Copenhagen Accord calls for the “immediate establish-
ment” of a mechanism to help mobilize resources for REDD-plus 
from developed countries and acknowledges the “need to provide 
positive incentives,” without resolving the issue of public vs. private 
support.
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
As with the mitigation issue, the MRV discussions have con-
cerned the level of MRV as well as the parallelism/differentiation 
between developed and developing country MRV. 
The Copenhagen Accord calls for “rigorous, robust and transpar-
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ent” MRV of Annex I emissions reductions and financing, “in accor-
dance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the COP.” 
As noted earlier, supported NAMAs by developing countries will 
be subject to international MRV “in accordance with guidelines 
adopted by the COP,” while so-called “autonomous” mitigation 
actions will be verified nationally and reported in national commu-
nications every two years and subject to “international consultations 
and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that 
national sovereignty is respected.” 
The Future of the Copenhagen Accord
Despite agreement on the Copenhagen Accord by the heads of 
state or government of more than 25 countries, including all of the 
major economies, the conference was unable to “adopt” the accord 
due to objections by a small group of countries, led by Sudan, 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua, which refused to join consen-
sus, arguing that the negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord by a 
smaller group represented a “coup d’état” against the United Nations 
because it bypassed the formal meetings. 
After an all-night session, the impasse was ultimately broken 
through a decision to “take note of” the Copenhagen Accord, giving 
it some status in the UNFCCC process but not as much as approval 
by the COP. 
Those countries that wish to “associate” themselves with the 
Copenhagen Accord are to notify the UNFCCC Secretariat for 
inclusion in the list of countries at the beginning of the accord.
As of February 10, 2010, the UNFCCC Secretariat had received 
submissions from more than 90 countries, representing more than 
80 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, regarding 
their plans to reduce their GHG emissions and/or their wish to be 
“associated” with the Copenhagen Accord. 
In most cases, countries providing information on their miti-
gation actions have expressly “associated” themselves with the 
Copenhagen Accord. 
The Copenhagen Accord asserts that it will be “operational 
immediately,” but fully operationalizing its terms will require further 
acts – for example, the spelling out of the guidelines for interna-
tional consultation and analysis of developing country mitigation 
actions and the establishment of the various bodies envisioned in 
the accord (a high level panel to study potential sources of revenue, 
the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund and a new technology mecha-
nism). 
Ordinarily, this work would be carried out by the COP. But if 
some countries continue to block consensus in the COP, as occurred 
in Copenhagen, then this elaboration of the Copenhagen Accord 
might need to be done by the “associators” group. 
Conclusion
Although the Copenhagen Accord has been criticized by some 
as inadequate, it represents a potentially significant breakthrough. 
True, the emission reduction pledges announced thus far do not 
put the world on a pathway to limiting climate change to 2 degrees 
Celsius, the ostensible long-term goal of the accord.5 
But the participating states did agree to list their national actions 
internationally and to subject their actions to some form of inter-
national scrutiny, even when their actions do not receive any inter-
national support. 
Plus, the accord articulates a quantified long-term goal for the 
first time (no more than 2 degree Celsius temperature increase) 
and puts significant new funds on the table, both for the short and 
medium terms.
As a political necessity, the Copenhagen Accord continues to 
reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities, but in a very different manner than in 
Kyoto. 
Developed countries committed to implement economy-wide 
emission reduction “targets,” subject to international MRV, while 
developing country “actions” will be subject to international MRV 
only if they receive international support and to national MRV 
otherwise. 
Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Accord reflects an apparent shift 
by China, India, Brazil and South Africa, which begins to break the 
so-called “firewall” between developed and developing countries. 
For the first time, major developing countries have agreed to 
reflect their national emission reduction pledges in an international 
instrument, to report on their GHG inventories and their mitiga-
tion actions in biennial national communications and to subject 
their actions either to MRV (for internationally supported actions) 
or “international consultation and analysis under clearly defined 
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected” (for 
domestically supported actions). 
This outcome may seem like a rather modest achievement, but 
it represents some measure of “internationalization” of developing 
country actions. 
In any event, if world leaders could not agree to more through 
direct negotiations, under an intense international spotlight, it is 
hard to see why mid-level negotiators will be able to achieve more 
anytime soon. 
As a result, the Copenhagen Accord may well represent the high-
water mark of the climate change regime for some time to come.
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